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Politics, Foreign Reserves and the ExchangeRate-Based-Stabilization-Policy
The Lebanese Case
Kassim M. Dakhlallah 1
American University in Dubai
________________________________________________________________________

Abstract
Lebanon, as well as many underdeveloped countries, uses its foreign reserves
as a tool to support its exchange rate based stabilization policy. Looking at the
causes behind fluctuations of foreign reserves is of extreme importance,
especially after it has been proved that foreign reserves are causes of stability
and disturbances to stabilization policies around the globe.

Of particular

interest is the political variable; it emerged in the literature that politics play a
strong role in determining the stability of the foreign reserves, but that did not
happen in Lebanon. Politics in Lebanon did not have an impact on the level of
foreign reserves, and it did not disturb the stabilization policy. My results,
however, confirm that the stabilization policy is a viable policy, and especially
after I showed that Lebanon’s key macroeconomic variables behave as
predicted by the stylized facts of exchange rate based stabilization policy.

1

Assistant Professor of Finance a the College of Business Administration at The American
University in Dubai, United Arab Emirates. P.O. Box 28282 Dubai UAE tel: +97143999000 ext.
342 Mobile number +971555821251 Fax: +97143998899 E-mail: kdakhlallah@aud.edu or
Casey_Dakh@Yahoo.com

1

Key words: Lebanese Economy, Foreign Reserves, Stabilization Policy
Lebanese Currency
Classification Code: F 31, F 37, F41

2

Introduction and theoretical background
a. Introduction
Foreign reserve holdings by central banks have been used as a tool to defend
the exchange-rate-based-stabilization-policies around the globe. The depletion
of these holdings is a major cause of concern. It is a dimension over which
there is little control; it relates among other things, to regional and domestic
politics. Focusing on this dimension is quite important, especially when we
consider that a small open economy like Lebanon with its history of political
instability is subject to reserve depletion due to its vulnerability to domestic
and regional politics. This vulnerability shakes confidence in the local
economy and raises the question as to whether the Lebanese financial authority
fulfils its commitment by protecting its stabilization policy in the event
political problems occur. Nonetheless, the policy of defending the stabilization
policy by direct intervention in the foreign exchange market proved to be very
successful, and that is despite the difficulties that the stabilization program has
encountered. Some of these difficulties are political instability, large budget
and current account deficits and huge debt. The large budget deficits, for
instance, created pressure for the government to monetize its debt and it put
upward pressure on inflation and downward pressure on the peg, thus losing
foreign reserves and putting the stabilization policy at risk.
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b. Theoretical Background
A significant amount of literature exists concerning the survival of the
ERBSP 2. The literature focused on the experience of countries plagued by
high and chronic inflation (rates above 30-40 percent a year) and by severe
macroeconomic instability. These experiences have several common elements:
after the stabilization policy is implemented, inflation usually falls, but
convergence to the inflation rate of the pegged currency is slow and
incomplete. Domestic demand rises quickly, output expands, national saving
declines, the current account deficit widens, and nominal interest rate falls.
i. Why governments adopt the ERBSP
It is important to explore the reasons that motivate governments to adopt the
ERBSP and that is despite the heavy burdens that governments could carry.
First, in the short run, a fixed exchange rate provides a nominal anchor for the
currency, thereby reducing inflationary expectations. In a longer-term view, it
makes access to international capital markets easier by providing more stability
and predictability in foreign exchange markets. Trade relations constitute a
second reason for fixing the exchange rate.

Small, open economies like

Lebanon that trade heavily with one or a few bigger partners do not have much
scope for an independent monetary policy, and a stable exchange rate carries
the advantage of reducing transactions cost. Third, a fixed exchange rate may
induce greater financial discipline on the part of the authorities since it places
2

Exchange Rate Based Stabilization Policy
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their foreign reserve holdings at risk. Fourth, a nominal exchange rate anchor
is readily observed by all participants in the economy and may be more
effective in reducing high inflation in the face of unstable money demand,
large movements in velocity, and a high degree of dollarization. Yet, even
well-engineered exchange-rate-based-stabilization programs that succeed in
bringing down inflation for a sustained period may set in motion a dynamic
process that can lead to a financial crisis and the program’s collapse.
II. Literature review
Several theories were set forth to explore the relationship between the holding
of foreign reserves and the ERBSP. Among them is:
i.

The first generation currency crisis model represented by (Krugman
1979), where economic agents perceive the decline of the stock of
foreign reserves, and to avoid losses, they launch a speculative attack
on the currency before it depletes, thus the collapse of the ERBSP.

ii.

The sticky inflation theory by (Dornbusch and Rodriguez 1982) states
that fixing the exchange rate reduces the nominal and real interest rate,
which leads to an appreciation of real exchange rate and a deterioration
of trade balance. Two opposing effects emerge: the expansionary effect
and the contractionary effect. The expansionary effect of the fall in the
interest rate dominates the contractionary effect of the loss of
competitiveness, causing aggregate demand to increase. The increase
in demand, combined with the inertia in inflation rates and the currency
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peg, causes an overvaluation of the domestic currency. Overvaluation,
in turn, causes output to decline and, eventually, leads to a speculative
attack on the currency; thus, the loss of foreign reserves and the
deterioration of the ERBSP.
iii.

The wealth effect theory by (Helpman and Razin 1987) is generated by
intergenerational redistribution of wealth, where the dynamics of
disinflation program, anchored by fixing the nominal exchange rate, are
driven by wealth effects. It results in a temporarily higher consumption
level, worsening trade accounts, large government debt, and reserve
losses.

iv.

In the second generation currency crisis model by (Obstfeld 1994),
there is a tension between the government’s desire to abandon its
ERBSP and its desire to defend it

by using its foreign reserves.

It

follows that the cost of defending the policy increases when people
suspect that the government is leaning towards abandoning the
stabilization policy.

Additional and relevant theories that explore the link between foreign reserves
and the ERBSP are presented by

(Calvo and Mendoza 1996a, b) and

(Krugman 1979). The theory states that because deposits are guaranteed by the
monetary authority, depositors do not question the behavior of bankers which
in turn induces bankers to pursue risky activities. As a result, the prospect of
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devaluation increases. Devaluation in turn leads to a shift from domestic
currency towards foreign currency.

Banks will not be able to honor the

depositors and will be rescued by the central bank as the lender-of-last-resort,
thus the economy loses foreign reserves. Krugman (1979) agreed with Calvo
and Mendoza (1996) but added that bankers are speculators who have nothing
to lose but a lot to gain from riskier portfolios, and that large current account
deficits with a slow inflow of capital leads to the expectation that foreign
reserves may reach exhaustion.
c. Definitions of success and failures
The definitions of success and failures of the ERBSP are of great importance,
and in order to define success or failure I follow the following criteria.
i.

Two or more years below 40 percent annual inflation following two or
more years above 40 percent constitutes a successful stabilization
episode (Bruno and Easterly 1995).

ii.

An “inflation crisis” as a period of at least two consecutive years of
inflation above 40 percent and “non-crisis” as a period of at least two
consecutive years with inflation below 40 percent (Easterly 1996).

iii.

(Hamann and Prati 2001) collected seven years of data:
stabilization year, three years before, and three years after.

the
They

implied that disinflation that lasts at least three years should be
classified as successful, but there is no presumption that they will not
fail later on.
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iv.

(Willett 1999) defines a successful stabilization program as one which
results in the reduction of annual inflation rates to the low double-to
single-digit range (below 25 percent per annum), without price and
wage controls, and maintains low rates for at least three years. Willett
does not believe that these criteria are too strong and, not wanting his
conclusions to rest on the use of a single controversial definition, he
considers a second looser indication of success that requires only that
there be a substantial reduction in inflation from the previous years that
is not due to wage and price controls.

In Part II of this paper, I test for the effectiveness of the ERBSP on inflation
and on the behavior of key macroeconomic variables. In Part III,
the variables that affect the holdings of foreign reserves.

I explore

I proceed by

implementing modern time series analysis where several variables are tested
on the dependent variable-‘Foreign Reserves’. In Part IV, I conclude with
policy recommendations.

Part II. Testing for the effectiveness of the ERBSP.
To test as to whether Lebanon’s stabilization policy produced the desired
outcome, I compare the behavior of some of its key macroeconomic variables to
those of four countries of Latin America that adopted the exchange rate as a
stabilization tool. The importance of the countries I chose stems from fact that
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after repeated failures their stabilization policies succeeded. By successful, I mean
key macroeconomics variables behaved as predicted by the stylized facts of
ERBSP 3 and that the success rate is based on the standard criteria used by the
above mentioned scholars. To illustrate success or failure, I denote the year in
which the stabilization program was initiated as year T and the years that followyear T+1, T+2 and T+3 and so on. I also identify the year before the stabilization
year as year T-1. Figure 1 illustrates that in year T, the stabilization year, the
inflation rate started to decline in all of the countries under study 4 and it continued
to decline in the subsequent years till T+6, an indication that the stabilization
policy was successful in controlling for inflation. This conclusion enables me to
proceed further by testing for the stylized facts of ERBSP.
a. Stylized Facts of Exchange Rate Based Stabilization Policies.
Reinhart and Vegh (1995), Khamis (1996), and Hamann (1999),

have

documented key stylized facts for ERBSP based on observing the behavior of
key macroeconomic variables that characterized the ERBSP in high inflation
countries during the past thirty years. Their observations include:
i.

Current account as a percent of GDP: The behavior of the current
account as a percent of GDP is considered as one of the key stylized
facts of ERBSP.

3

4

The current account deteriorates with the current

Most of those countries used the foreign reserve as a tool to defend the stabilization policy. They
include Lebanon, Argentina, Brazil, Peru and Mexico whose stabilization program started at
year T. T for Argentina corresponds to 1991.2, for Brazil 1994.3, for
Mexico 1988.1, for Lebanon 1992.12, for Peru 1990.4
Mexico, Argentina, Brazil and Peru provide important and highly contrasting experiences with
ERBS programs. Each of their economies suffered financial crisis because of reserves depletion.
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account deficits being financed by large capital inflows. 5 In a (small)
open economy like Lebanon subject to exogenous shocks, central banks
sometimes try to use monetary (or credit) policy in an attempt to
counter the effects of terms of trade disturbances.

Under these

circumstances, domestic credit would be expanded when the terms of
trade worsen, and contracted when the terms of trade improve. The
current account, as a percent of GDP for Lebanon, Brazil, Argentina,
Peru, and Mexico, exhibits the predictable J curve, an initial decrease,
and then an increase as illustrated by Figure 2.
ii.

Domestic Credit as a percent of GDP:

Under fixed exchange rates,

the magnitude of credit expansion will be restricted by the availability
of international reserves and the country’s capacity to borrow
internationally.

The share of private credit (lending to the private

sector in domestic currency) as a percent of GDP resumed the upward
trend for Lebanon, Brazil, Argentina, Mexico and Peru since the
initiation of their stabilization policies. This is predicted by one of the
stylized facts of ERBSP, a steady increase, and then a decline, as
shown in Figure 3.
iii.

Fiscal Discipline: The success of the stabilization policy did not seem
to discipline governments’ fiscal spending.

5

However, these

Reliable data on capital flow for Lebanon are not available because capital flow in
and out throughout private individuals. Nevertheless, some inference about the size
of such flows may be drawn from changes in foreign reserves of the BDL.
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governments realized that unless fiscal behavior is controlled, the
stabilization policy would eventually collapse. Figure 4 6 illustrates
clearly the shift in government policies from worsening to improving
their fiscal discipline.

The sustainability of a fiscal policy program

depends on, among other factors, the overall macroeconomic policy
mix and the current level and structure of the debt-to-GDP ratio. In
Lebanon, and due to war recovery effort, a sharp increase in
government expenditure was the predominant characteristic of public
finances during the period 1993-97.

Government expenditure rose

from 23 percent of GDP in 1993 to 42 percent in 1997.

This

expenditure category consists primarily of salaries and wages,
purchases of goods and services, and transfers and subsidies. Mexico’s
fiscal discipline, as illustrated by Figure 5, did not behave as predicted.
Mexico’s fiscal discipline improved at the time the stabilization policy
was initiated, but worsened at a later stage which led to the Mexican
financial crisis and the collapse of the ERBSP.
iv.

Gross National Expenditures: The initiation of a stabilization policy
triggers an expansion in economic activities that is primarily caused by
a private consumption boom and an increase in real wages. Although
the post-stabilization path of the economic activity level reproduces the

6

I used the actual budget deficit as a percent of GDP. I did not use the standardized budget deficit
because it lacks data on tax revenue and because many of the countries under studies do not
depend on tax as a major source of revenue.

11

usual economic boom that follows stabilization programs based on
exchange-rate anchors, such a boom did not appear in Lebanon, as
shown in Figure 6, and that could be attributed to the fact that most of
the economic activities at the early stages of the stabilization program
were due to war recovery effort.
In light of the above findings, it is legitimate to conclude that the stabilization
program in Lebanon induced key macroeconomic variables to behave as
predicted by the stylized fact of exchange rate stabilization policy, and thus it
produced the desired outcome. This conclusion enables me to proceed with the
empirical analysis.

Part III. Empirical analysis
I begin the empirical analysis by explaining the explanatory variables, and then
I proceed to results interpretations.
a. Explanatory Variables:
i.

Foreign Reserve: The international reserves net of gold holdings.
The inclusion of gold will not change the results of the paper for two
reasons. First, central banks in general do not vary their holdings of
gold reserves.

Second, gold holdings by central banks lost its

importance since the collapse of the Bretton-Woods system in the
early 1970s.
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ii.

Dollarization:

Defined as the ratio of foreign currency deposits to

total deposits. In a country such as Lebanon, which has been marked
by political instability, currency substitution/dollarization must be
investigated carefully. When there is extensive currency substitution it
is likely that monetary shocks will be relatively larger in magnitude,
as unexpected shifts between domestic and foreign capital may occur.
A negative sign is expected
iii.

Domestic Credit:

An increase in private sector credit growth, being

interpreted as an increase in GDP growth, would, ceteris paribus,
reduces the fiscal deficit as a percent of GDP and reduces the supply
of domestic assets and increases the demand for domestic assets,
thereby increasing the foreign reserves. A positive sign is expected
iv.

Interest rate differential: The cost of holding reserves which is the
difference between Lebanese three months treasury bills and
comparable US three months treasury bills. The differential has been
Large and positive since the 1980’s.

From this perspective, the

persistent positive interest rate differential in Lebanon reflects its
status as a postwar economy.

However, given the unsterilized

intervention a positive sign is expected
v.

Dummy Variable:

The 0-1 dummy variable (D) takes the value of 1

during periods of heightened political uncertainty, such as anitgovernment demonstrations, number of assassinations, major cabinet
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changes, and major government crisis, war on national territory, civil
war, and sectarian tension. A negative sign is expected
vi.

External debt: Many studies discovered that external debt is among
the main factors contributing to foreign reserves depletion. Thus a
positive sign is expected.

vii.

Confidence variable: Presented by the ratio of short term debt to
foreign reserves.

High ratio of short-term debt to reserve makes it

hard for the country to pay off all short-term creditors in the event of a
panic. Thus, the country is more vulnerable to a confidence crisis. A
negative sign is expected
b. Data:
The data is monthly, ranging from 1993 till end of 2005. It is taken from the
Lebanese Central Bank, the International Financial Statistics, and the World
Development Indicators. I estimate the above variables using Ordinary Least
Squares for the period of January 1993 to December 2005. I chose this set of
dates because it is the time period starting from the initiation of the
stabilization policy till the assassination of late Prime Minister Hariri.

c. Regression analysis:
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I start this section by regressing the dependent variable “Foreign Reserve” on
the independent variables as shown in the below equation, but before I proceed
I must look for stationary and correct for it.

LNFR = α + β 1 LN(FCD /TD ) + β 2 LN ( DC ) + β 3 LN (i leb − i us ) + β LN ( D )
t
t
t
4
t
t
t
+ β ( ED ) + β ( STD / FR ) + ε t
5
t
6
t
t
•

LN (FR):

•

LN ( FCDt / TDt ): Natural Log of dollarization

•

LN( DC t ):

Natural Log of domestic credit to private sector

•

LN( itLeb − itUS ):

Natural Log of interest rate differential between

Natural Log of international reserve net of gold holdings

Lebanese three month treasury bill minus US three
Months Treasury bills
•

LN( SRDt / TRt ): Natural Log of confidence interval measured as the
ratio of short term debt to total reserve.

•

( Dt ):

Dummy variable

•

LN( EDt ):

Natural Log of external debt

i.

Testing for stationary: Theory suggests that shocks to a stationary time
series are temporary; the effect of the shocks will dissipate and the
series will revert to its long-run mean. Non-stationary variables, on the
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other hand, may have a pronounced trend or meander without a
constant long-run mean or variance. In addition, a stationary error term
means that the variables have tended to move together over the long
run; and that if an exogenous shock drives the variables out of
equilibrium,

there is a tendency for them to move together again. In

order to test for the presence of a unit root, I use the Dickey-Fuller and
the Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests.

The Philip-Perron test, which

entails less stringent restriction on the error process, is used as well. It
is important, however, to mention that structural change complicates
the tests for trends; a structural break makes an otherwise stationary
series appear to be non-stationary.

For instance, the series ‘Foreign

Reserve’ exhibits a structural break and with that, Dickey-Fuller and
Phillips-Perron test statistics are biased toward the non rejection of a
unit root. By applying the above tests, Table 1 and table 2, I conclude
that all of the variables except the “Dummy variable’ has a unit root,
thus a correction is required.
ii.

Correcting for stationary:
different

treatment

for

The correction for stationarity entails
different

variables.

Series

such

as

‘Dollarization’, ‘Interest Rate Differential’, and ‘Confidence’, can be
transformed into a stationary model by differencing. On the other
hand, series that exhibits sustained upward trend such as ‘External
Debt’ and ‘Domestic Credit’ can be transformed into a stationary
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model by removing the deterministic trend; consequently, a serious
problem is encountered when the inappropriate method is used. Thus,
the de-trending procedure entails estimating the series ‘External
Debt’, EDt , on a constant and time and estimating the series ‘Domestic
Credit’, DC t , on a constant and time as shown by Equation a and
Equation b.
LN ( EDt ) =

LN ( DCt ) =

6.39. + 0.02 time + e t
(141.59) (51.52)

Eq. a

9.438 + 0.0131 time + e t
(327.033) (37.425)

Eq. b

The t-statistic (shown in parentheses) in Eq. a and Eq. b indicates that the
coefficients are highly significant, and by observing the ACF and PACF of the
de-trended data in ‘External Debt’ series, the ACF does die out after 16
months. In such a case, de-trending the data does result in a stationary series
and the residuals, (e t ), become the de-trended values of the ‘External Debt’.
On the other hand, the ACF for the series ‘Domestic Credit’ does not die out
after 16 months which means that de-trending the data does not result in a
stationary series. The remedy is to regress the variable ‘Domestic Credit’ on
time, time squared and time cubed as shown in Eq. c. The t-statistic (shown
in parentheses) in Eq. c are significant; thus (e t ) become the de-trended values
of the series ‘Domestic Credit’.
Log ( DC t ) = 9.04 + 0.03 t − 0.00014 t 2 + 1.3178176e − 0.07t 3
( 693.62 )

( 38.75 )

( −10.85 )

( 2.225 )
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Eq. c

iii.

The first round of Analysis: Having corrected for stationarity, I begin
with the first round of analysis and I derive the following results







 FCD 






t
+ 0.82  DC + 0.156 Log  i Leb − ius  + 0.0052 D  − Log 0.046 ED 
Log ( FRt ) =  0.0067  − 1.17 Log 






t
t
t
t


t




TD







 1.84 
t 
 3.15 
 1.06 
 0.51
 − 3.26 

 −6.03 


 STD 
t + ε
 FR  t
t 

 −6.37 

− 0.21Log 

R 2 = 0.6

DW= 1.56

Eq. 1

F=33.96

R 2 = 0.6 Suggest that the regression equation is a good fit, and the F test at
33.39 is highly significant which means that the model is good in predicting
the level of foreign reserves.

However, the DW of 1.56 implies serial

correlation which requires additional testing.

Additional testing for the

presence of serial correlation is conducted by using the Breusch-Godfrey Serial
correlation LM.

Unlike the Durbin-Watson statistic for AR(1) errors, the

(Breusch-Godfrey, 1978) Serial correlation LM test is applicable whether or
not there are lagged dependent variables. In addition, the F statistic shown in
Table 3 is an omitted variable test for the joint significance of all lagged
squared residuals. The observations times R-squared statistic is the Engle’s
LM test statistic, computed as the number of observations times the R 2 from
the test regression. Therefore, the test does not reject the hypothesis of no
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serial correlation up to order four, indicating that the error terms are serially
correlated.

In addition, the analysis of table 4 indicates that the Auto

Regressive Conditional Heteroskedasticity and the White Heteroskedasticity
tests for Eq. 1 reject the null hypothesis of no Heteroskedasticiy.

The assumption of normality is tested for by using (Jarque – Bera 1987). It is a
statistic for testing whether the series is normally distributed.

The kurtosis of

Eq. 1 is 10.69 which entails that the distribution is peaked relative to the
normal.

Under the null hypothesis of a normal distribution, the Jarque-Bera

statistic is distributed as X 2 with 2 degrees of freedom.

The reported

probability is the probability that the Jarque-Bera statistic is 423.2, which
exceeds (in absolute value) the observed value under the null hypothesis.
Therefore, the null hypothesis is rejected at the 0% level of significance
indicating that the error term is normally distributed with mean almost equal to
zero; thus satisfying the assumptions that the error term must be normally
distributed with zero mean.
iv. The Second Round of Analysis: The interpretation of equation 1 illustrates
that the results exhibit low R-squared and that the presence of serial correlation
persists. I correct for serial correlation
side of Eq. 2
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by adding AR(1) on the right hand


 FCDt
Log (FRt ) = 0.0051 − 1.15Log 
1.66
 TDt
 − 6.9

)

(





 leb us 
 
 + 0.97 Log  DC t  + 0.162 Log  it − it  + 0.0076 Dt 
4
.
17
3
.
94
−




 0.87 




 STDt


− 0.059 Log  EDt  − 0.166 Log 
 1.54 
 FRt
 −5.79



 (1)  + e
 t
 − 0.051 AR
 − 0.662 



Eq. 2

R 2 = 0.6 5, DW=1.78, and F=34.4
The three indicators improved relative to Eq. 1.

In addition, skewness

improved to 0.635, the Jaque-Bera improved to 19.3, and the Kurtosis
improved to 4.3. However, dummy’s coefficient that was expected to show
strong improvement after the correction

did not perform. This could be

attributed to the fact that the impact of the political shock was not felt till
several months.
v. Final round of analysis: Several lags were tried on each of the explanatory
variables of Eq.2. The results did not improve till I lagged the ‘Dummy
Variable’ Dt by three periods. The derived results are shown in Eq. 3

 FCDt
Log (FRt ) = 0.0039 − 1.18Log 
1.186
 TDt
 −6.9

(

)





 Leb us 
 + 0.884 Log  DC t  + 0.156 Log  it − it 
 3.93 
 −3.8 




 STDt




+ 0.019  Dt −3 − 0.062 EDt  − 0.166 Log 
 2.21 
 1.71 
 FRt
 5.7



 (1)  + e Eq.3
 t
 + 0.058 AR
 0.636 



The three main indicators, R 2 =0.67, DW=2.01, F=37.9, improved in
comparison to Eq. 2.
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IV.

Interpretation of Results

In interpreting the new results in equation 3, the intercept is positive and
significant, which means that if all the variables are equal to zero, the inflow of
capital continues. Capital flows to Lebanon because of the large number of
Lebanese expatriates living outside of Lebanon.

Due to reasons that are

beyond the scope of this paper, most Lebanese expatriates transfer money to
Lebanon regardless of the political situation, and regardless of government
policy, national debt, interest rate differential or domestic credit. On the other
hand, the political variable represented by the dummy variable shows weak
and positive relationship vis-à-vis the level of foreign reserves. That is contrary
to what has been found by previous scholars. (Radelet and Sachs 1998) found
out that major causes of reserve depletion are political instability.

It is

important however, to explain the reasons that isolated the holding of foreign
reserves from the political situation. First, political tension in Lebanon is a
double-edged sword which is likely to exacerbate the depletion of the foreign
reserves such as to alleviate it. In addition, the capital that inflows to Lebanon
can be categorized into two different categories. The first category is the “Hot
Capital”;

the accumulation of “Hot Capital” should be a major concern

because these flows are quickly reversible in the case of a change in the
political conditions. The second category is the “Political Capital”; it flows to
Lebanon in the form of financial aid to the government and to the people by
foreign governments and world financial institutions. I conclude that when the
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political situation worsens, “Hot Money” outflows while “Political Money”
inflows. The results I derived in Eq. 3 show that the political money is slightly
stronger than the hot money. I conclude that political tensions in Lebanon
trigger capital to inflow to the country rather than to outflow.

Additional interpretation into Eq. 3 indicates that the extent of ‘Dollarization’
has the strongest impact on the ‘Foreign Reserve’ with a significant coefficient
of 1.18. In a country such as Lebanon, where the dollar is used as a medium of
exchange, unit of account and store of value; ‘Dollarization’ must be looked
and analyzed carefully. When the Lebanese pound started to depreciate since
the early 80’s till the early 90’s, the ordinary Lebanese

citizen did not

comprehend fast enough the meaning of a depreciated currency; thus the rate
of depreciation was much faster than an ordinary Lebanese citizen can
understand. However, the situation changed completely during the 90’s and
early 2000. When political turmoil or suspicion about the economy occurred,
people did not hesitate to convert the domestic currency to US dollars; thus the
impact of dollarization on the level of foreign reserves was felt immediately.
Furthermore, the growth of ‘Domestic Credit’, (DC t ) to the private sector is
positive and significant with a coefficient of 0.88 and t = 3.39. The growth of
domestic credit is correlated to the growth of the gross domestic product, thus
economic growth translates into higher level of reserves.
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External debts

( ED t ) series is negative with a coefficient of 0.06 and t-test of 1.71. Donor
countries provide easy loans to Lebanon in order to increase its holding of
foreign reserves. This build up of reserve has been used as cushion signaling
the authorities’ commitment to their ERBSP by conducting unsterilized
intervention. Interest rate differential between short-term assets denominated
in Lebanese pounds and comparable US dollar assets have been large and
positive since the 1990’s. The average interest rate differential between threemonth treasury bills denominated in Lebanese pounds and U.S dollars has
amounted to about 12 percent. During the 80’s, the large differentials reflected
the war-related macroeconomic instability, and the large differential continued
to be large even after the end of 1992, when the authorities moved decisively
to overcome the inflationary expectations by adopting the ERBSP, which has
been maintained since. Last variable is the ‘Confidence’ variable.

It is

significant and negative. It indicates that the accumulation of short term debt
reduces confidence in the economic system.

IV. Policy Recommendations
Despite the political turmoil that Lebanon experienced, the ERBSP survived
and the holdings of reserves remained strong. In light of that, it is legitimate to
conclude that the ERBSP is a viable policy for Lebanon. I attribute my
decision to several reasons: the stabilization policy supported by the high level
of foreign reserves succeeded in stabilizing the price level, and it induced key
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macroeconomic variables to behave as predicted by the stylized facts of
ERBSP which is a sign of a healthy economy. In addition, the ERBSP brought
confidence to the Lebanese currency by reducing the level of dollarization.
However, dollarization must be an issue of concern to policy makers and it
cannot be ignored.

One of the quickest remedies for keeping low levels of

dollarization is to increase the interest rate on the Lebanese Pound, but too
much of an increase may generate the opposite effect. Some institutional
measures to cut on dollarization might be appropriate.

Furthermore, the

Lebanese government must take additional steps is to

stabilize its fiscal

account, that the level of external debt resulting from government borrowing
drops, so the stock of reserves does not reach low levels that can reduce the
validity of the stabilization policy. In addition, good macroeconomic policies,
manageable fiscal deficits and monetary policy directed towards sustaining the
ERBSP are extremely important, but these policies must be accompanied by
good political climate and efficient institutions. Without the proper settings,
maintaining the ERBSP may become so costly that the government may
abandon it. Consistency between macro and fiscal policies are crucial to the
survival of the ERBSP. The monetary policy and the fiscal and trade policies
must be devoted entirely to maintaining the ERBSP. If these policies do not
support stabilization policy, costs will eventually outweigh benefits and the
peg will become prohibitively expensive to maintain. In this case, it would be
better to abandon the policy when the costs of doing so are still low.
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The

costs of maintaining and abandoning the ERBSP is also important with regard
to credibility issues. A government that tries to create credibility by pegging
the currency can reap short-term benefits by lowering inflationary expectations
and eliminating exchange rate volatility. However, this credibility must be
earned by prudent macroeconomic management and institutional development.
Therefore, in principle, there is no way for policymakers to categorically prove
to the public that the ERBSP will be protected until the economy actually
arrives at a point when the public expects the policy to change its course.
Hence, in practice the stabilization program in Lebanon is likely to suffer from
credibility problems at some point.
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Table 1. Philip_Perron Test, Jan. 93-Dec. 05
Test Statistics

CV 8

Variables in LN
 FCDt 
 (DCt ) itleb − itus
TD 
t 


(

(FRt ) 

) (D ) (ED )

 STDt

 TR
 t

t

t






PP

-2.21

-2.01

-6.03

0.15

-11.24 -3.08

-1.69

-2.88

PP (1)

-9.48

-7.59

-10.88

-8.03

- 84.31 -12.41

-8.06

-2.88

Table 2. Dickey Fuller Test, Jan. 93-Dec. 05
Test Statistics

CV

(FRt )

 FCDt

 TD
t



 (DCt )



DF

0.38

-1.46

1.01

0.88

-10.52

2.06

-1.05

-1.94

ADF

-1.262 -2.04

-6.55

-0.241

-11.72

-2.45

-1.41

-2.88

-3.93

-8.07

-8.89

-12.40 -7.77

-2.88

ADF (1) - 9.35

8

Variables in LN

-7.59

(i

leb
t

− itus

At the 5% Level
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) (D ) (ED )
t

t

 STDt

 TR
 t






Table 3. Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test:
F statistic Probability
Equation (1) 0.79

Obs*R squared

0.45

1.66

Probability
0.44

Table 4. Auto Regressive Conditional Heteroskedasticity and the white
Test:
F statistic Probability
Obs*R squared
Probability
ARCH

2.88

0.092

2.86

0.091

White

2.72

0.003

26.6

0.005
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